Have you heard about anonymous communication? It is an idea introduced by David Chaum that relies on public key cryptography that permits an electronic mail system to hide whom a participant communicates with as well as the content of the communication. The fundamental building block of such a high latency anonymous communication systems could be a mix. At a high level, a mix could be a process that accepts encrypted messages as input and groups many messages together into a batch. And so decrypts and forwards all or some of the messages in the batch.
Peer-to-peer anonymous communication approach promise to eliminate the measurability issues. And central vulnerability points of current networks like Tor. However, the P2P setting introduces several new opportunities for attack. And previous designs don’t offer an adequate level of anonymity.
Anonymity systems forward user traffic through a path of proxy servers. In some systems, together with Tor, the proxies on the circuit are chosen from among a large variety of obtainable proxies. Each of that is supposed to be operated by a unique person. An attacker, however, may run a considerable fraction of the proxies below different identities. He would then be able to deanonymize users whose circuits run through his attacker controlled proxies.
There are mainly three levels of anonymity. They are:
- Sender Anonymity
- Receiver Anonymity
- Sender and Receiver Anonymity
The anonymous communication can be used in many social networks also. This helps to construct circuits that are stronger to compromise than any previous approach among decentralized anonymity systems. We tend to make benefit of the fact that, once protected against manipulation. Also random walks on social network topologies are likely to stay among the honest users.
The key challenge in this setting is to stop the adversary from biasing the random walk by manipulating their routing tables. To this end, we tend to propose the reciprocal neighbor policy. If malicious nodes attempt to exclude honest nodes throughout peer discovery. Then honest nodes will use a tit-fortat approach and exclude the malicious nodes from their routing tables.
Most attacks on anonymous communication networks offer the adversary with probabilistic data on the identity of the entities communicating with one another. This is often the reason why information theoretical anonymity metrics are mostly adopted to quantify the anonymity provided by a range of designs.
Individuals and organizations, as well as on-line forums, on-line services, and web service providers, should, in general, be allowed to see the circumstances under that anonymity is allowable in communications using their facilities. Forums for communication, like newsgroups, chat rooms, as well as universities and companies; should be inspired to develop, adopt, and implement their own policies and practices concerning anonymity.
People should have available a full range of anonymous communication choices. And methods and may be free to confirm the degree to which they need to be identified or stay anonymous after they interact in voluntary interactions. A key condition is mutuality – that’s, individuals should be treated like “consenting adults.”3